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# Encrypted session storage for paid and enterprise users

# Source: [https://reclaimllm.com/news/encrypted-session-storage-for-paid-and-enterprise-users](https://reclaimllm.com/news/encrypted-session-storage-for-paid-and-enterprise-users)

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Jun 17, 2026

# Encrypted Session Storage for Paid and Enterprise Users

Paid users and enterprise organizations can protect raw session details with encrypted storage, one-time recovery keys, and controlled decrypt access.

ReclaimLLM is adding encrypted storage for raw session details for paid users and enterprise organizations.

The goal is straightforward: full session content can contain source code, prompts, tool output, file paths, credentials accidentally pasted into a terminal, and other sensitive development context. Encrypting raw session storage reduces the blast radius of storage-level exposure while keeping search, stats, summaries, and high-level analytics usable.

Paid users can enable encryption for their own sessions. Enterprise org admins can enable encryption across their organization.

## How It Works

For paid individual users, encryption is controlled from account settings. When a user enables it, ReclaimLLM generates a recovery key once and prompts the user to download it. The key is not emailed, and ReclaimLLM does not store the plaintext value.

The product stores only enough metadata to recognize that a recovery key exists, such as a hash, the last few characters, and when it was generated. If the key is lost, ReclaimLLM cannot show that same plaintext recovery key again.

For enterprise customers, encryption is configured at the organization level. An org admin enables encrypted session storage for the organization and downloads one org recovery key. Enterprise members do not receive separate recovery keys in this model. Admin and team-lead access to encrypted member session details is controlled through the organization's decrypt-access policy.

This keeps the enterprise model aligned with how teams actually manage data: encryption is an org-level security control, and recovery material is handled by the organization's admins.

## What Stays Usable

Encryption is focused on raw session details, not every derived field.

High-level operations like stats, summaries, similarity signals, filters, and dashboard views continue to operate on derived metadata. Those views are meant to stay fast and useful without needing to decrypt every full session transcript.

Opening the full details of a session is different. That path requires decrypt access because it may expose the raw transcript, tool calls, and captured session payload.

This split matters for performance and usability. Teams should still be able to answer questions like "how many sessions ran this week?" or "which projects are most active?" without forcing every analytics view through a decrypt path.

## Why This Helps

Developer sessions are unusually sensitive. They often contain the exact working context around a codebase: commands, filenames, diffs, stack traces, architectural notes, API payloads, and sometimes secrets that should not have been captured.

Encrypted storage adds another boundary around that raw data. It does not replace access control, redaction, or careful secret handling, but it makes stored session payloads harder to misuse if storage is exposed outside the normal application path.

For paid users, this gives individual control over private session history.

For enterprise customers, this gives org admins a central security setting for member sessions while preserving admin workflows and team-level review.

## Current Limits

This is not per-user zero-knowledge encryption for enterprise. Enterprise encryption is org-wide, and recovery is handled through one org-held recovery key.

Losing a downloaded recovery key means the plaintext recovery key cannot be shown again. Users and org admins should store it in the same secure system they already use for sensitive credentials.

We are watching for feedback around key rotation, customer-managed keys, team-level encryption domains, and multiple recovery-key custodians. Those are important cases, but they need explicit design rather than being added as accidental complexity to the first encryption model.

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